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1.
The Oberhausen Manifesto, signed by twenty-six German filmmakers, among them Kluge and Edgar Reitz, was issued on February 28, 1962, during the Oberhausen short-film festival. The best general study of the motives of the signers can be found in Rainer Lewandowski's Die Oberhausener. Rekonstruktion einer Gruppe 1962-1982, Diekholzen, Verlag fur Biihne und Film, 1982. Interview with Alexander Kluge feelings of omnipotence of an eight-year-old. If I understand it correctly, Rambo has a relationship to the classical circus, which, like the Roman circus with its animals, also shows the omnipotence of men. That is, Rambo is a gruesome way of expressing fantasies of omnipotence. This is, so to speak, what the movies are. It is said that a medium must function at the average age of the majority of the population. That is the case for television, but the cinema has slid down into "kids' pictures." I say this not as a critic, but because one must understand this change. It is not only a political question, but a consequence of a persistent and total overburdening of people, which expresses itself ever farther from the sphere of their lives as producers. They suffer, they experience cognitive dissonance when they perceive how they live. If I feel myself as the producer of my life, then I am unhappy. So I would rather be a spectator of my life. I would rather change my life this way since I cannot change it in society. So at night I see films that are different from my experiences during the day. Thus there is a strict separation between experience and the cinema. That is the obstacle for our films. For we are people of the '60s, and we do not believe in the opposition between experience and fiction. SL: The effort to break down the opposition has been a persistent concern of yours from the beginning. It has motivated the kinds of cinema you and some of your colleagues have produced. It has also motivated your production tactics and institutional politics. Perhaps you could talk briefly about the ideology of the "cooperative film," which became very important during the late 1970s and early 1980s, when, while making Germany in Autumn collectively with many other filmmakers, the limitations of an "author's cinema" became clear.
AK: Autorenpolitik had two infantile disorders. The first was isolation. At the very moment in which such films were successful they were also alone. They couldn't convey what their experience was. They were cut off from exchange with the rest of society. The second infantile disorder had to do with the conflict between the moral and aesthetic dimensions of our work.
SL: What do you mean by that?
AK: In 1977, the Left in Germany was in a process of self-destruction. We had to understand this. We had to understand, for example, the Baader-Meinhof group. We were not judges; we were not politicians; we were not responsible for the whole of society. But we felt responsible for drawing society's attention to things. Precisely because we are not powerful we must grasp everything. That is why we always come up against censorship -especially when we receive subsidies. That is why we resolved to make films that did not require subsidies. Also ones that could not receive any. At the beginning, each of us had the energy to make ten or twenty minutes. Any of us alone would be beaten by society. When united, we OCTOBER could defeat all opponents. Together we could be strong against the censor. I could be relaxed and risk not always making a Kluge film when Fassbinder, Schlondorff, Reitz, and Brustellin were with me. There is no contradiction, however, between the terms Autorenfilm and cooperative film, because the energy of a number of people is always combined, even by the film industry in Hollywood. All forms of manufacture, all concerns can add one unit of work to another. The individual concept of Politik der Autoren, in fact, can't compete in the long run if we do not understand how to cooperate. SL: Were you surprised -I certainly was -that these films, Germany in Autumn, The Candidate, and War and Peace, actually made money? They earned back all their production costs, did they not? This would be an almost unthinkable situation in the United States. AK: Yes. There was no subsidy, and they made back their production costs. SL: Despite their success, however, doesn't the apparent lack of traditional outlets for most of the products of New German Cinema suggest that innovative German film has moved into a kind of cultural ghetto? Sad as it makes me to recognize it, this has been the fate of the New American Cinema. AK: Not in television, but in the cinemas. Not in literature, but in cinemas; not concerning music, but in cinemas. Syberberg can show all his films in the opera house, but never in the cinemas. I could show all my films in a theater, not in a movie theater, but in a "real" theater. I could show mine in the cinemas, but they would not have an audience as long as people are so overpowered by real conditions. They have worries, they have the same reasons that they had in 1929 to flee from reality. They would move to greener pastures if they existed. The greener pastures, at that time financed by Privy Councillor Hugenberg,5 still tried to respond to the entire population. Today, only a small segment tries to respond. SL: Then why work for the movie theaters anymore, if you know that there is no audience? AK: Because we do not believe the situation is permanent. I don't want to complain so much. We do not believe that these conditions will prevail for long. We are involving ourselves in the new private TV medium, and we will make cinema there. We are bringing film history into it. We now have the "Hour of
5.
Alfred Hugenberg (1865-1951). In 1927, Hugenberg took control of the largest German film production company, UFA. An early collaborator with Hitler, he served for a short while as Economics Minister.
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Interview with Alexander Kluge the Filmmakers," and we are making sixty hours a year,6 which is a lot of film. We are making programs that offer film stories to a large majority of the population. We're influencing TV very powerfully, but we want eventually to reestablish the cinema. We will come through television to cinema again and won't leave 35mm. It's not necessary. It's the best material, because it provides the best information, even for television. But for the moment we can only get to a general audience through television. In cinema, we have an audience of people twelve to eighteen years old, which is not the social group who are the proprietors of Lebenserfahrung SL: So your television projects are a kind of tactical move, a detour through a more private, domestic distribution system for cinema before, perhaps, ultimately regaining the cinema? AK: Yes, we are realizing the concept of Autorenfilm in a different area. Some of the potential of the New German Cinema went to television. For example, Edgar Reitz made Heimat, which is a film simply for television. He made Stunde Null for television. If people do not leave their homes anymore, and they look through this so-called window which is television, then we have to go to the people and not just wait in the cinema. For if they have reasons not to go to the cinema, or if they have reasons to select the films that they do-they do and we must accept them-and we must find something to do to keep in touch with them. Afterward we will have to reestablish the cinema. For the moment, our audiences are tied to television. SL: Could you give me some examples? Do you know precisely how large your audiences are for both media? AK: For my films, for a single film in the theaters, I have approximately 90,000 spectators. On television I have approximately 800,000 spectators. One can precisely measure this. For his last cinema film, Reitz had approximately 100,000 spectators. He had more than twenty-one million viewers for Heimat in Germany and even more throughout the world. This difference shows that it is not that people are not interested, but they can no longer participate in the old classical public sphere with any feeling. There are many different reasons for this. Women will not go into the city alone at night; they're afraid of being raped. So they don't go to the cinema. Secondly, these films are too coarse. Why would they look at Rambo when they want their feelings to be treated gently? These are 6.
As of January 1988, production of programs had dropped to roughly half this figure.
7.
Kluge is here referring to the title of the book he coauthored with Oskar Negt, sections of which are translated in this issue.
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OCTOBER films for young men, not for women at all. The identifications do not work this way. Older people don't go to the cinema because they feel uncomfortable in these surroundings. It is not so easy to combine seriousness and popularity, but that is what we are trying to do in television. The "politics of authorship" can survive only if we solve these problems. SL: Your involvement with the politics of television dates back more than fifteen years. You were one of the principal political figures behind the 1974 German law, as well as of its revision in 1979, that established the basis for cooperation, including coproductions, between the state-owned television system and independent film producers. I don't think it's an exaggeration to say that a great deal of German film production, especially the most formally challenging and politically provocative works of the last fifteen years, would have been impossible without it. In the last few years you have also been very active in helping to shape a new law governing satellite and cable television in Germany. For what does it provide? What will it mean for independent filmmakers? AK: There are, in Europe, two developmental directions for television. The first direction is the Italian one, in which a state TV system like the RAI becomes ever more narrow-minded, and, on the other hand, the Berlusconi concern8 begins to offer American fast-food communication. Both are like islands in the Italian landscape. It's as if there were only McDonalds, and yet we know that in Italy there are other kinds of food and places where you can eat slowly and a lot. These penetrations into very old cultures-that is what we fear. We know from the situation in Great Britain that the situation can be entirely different. The BBC never had advertisements, and the "A" channel, which did accept advertising, never reached more than fifty percent of the people. So a balance came into being. Now there is Channel 4, a channel that accepts advertising but also develops programs for minorities. So a very balanced system has come into being, which pleases me as a European. In Germany we've had the new media, that is, the private media, for the past two years. Before this, television was a government monopoly, an arrangement which is rather unusual to Americans. Our concern is this: how can we, with all the power of the New German Cinema, in conjunction with the opera houses and book publishers, that is, with all the noncontemporary media, bring in independent productions for at least ten percent of all air time on the governmental and the private channels? That is, moreover, what we have always proposed. We would like to preserve the kind of freedom in which the directors of opera houses, such as Klaus Everding, or of the Schauspielhaus, such as Peter Zadek or Peter Stein, would make their own experiments. In the governmental TV system there are Redakteurs; it is con-
8.
Silvio Berlusconi is an Italian television entrepreneur. AK: From SAT 1 we don't get any money. Now, for the new channel, RTL Plus, we have a contract with a big Japanese concern, Dentso, one of the largest advertising companies in Japan that does not now exist in Europe, which will establish a joint venture with Young and Rubicam, "DYR." We are the proprietors of the time and they are the sponsors. They are interested only in the advertising space and they have arranged sponsorships. They will subscribe in advance for the advertising for our programs in our ten percent of the airtime. AK: We don't sell it. We give the right to broadcast it once. They risk that the product doesn't fit. They pay first and see the product later. Therefore we have the political and the economic possibility to have our products stay in the mainstream. For example, they will sell three minutes of advertising time in one hour of prime time for 150,000 DM. Later they will sell the other three minutes for 150,000 DM, and that is their profit. We pay half of the costs and derive the rest from the advertising revenue. That means that we can spend 300,000 DM for each hour of new programming at prime time. AK: We-Everding, Ernst Piper, and I-are proprietors of time. Look, we do not want to decide these things. It's dangerous and time-consuming, and we are not managers. Therefore, we do it in a very simple way. Next year, fifty-two hours will be divided: twenty-six hours will be for Der Spiegel, the most incisive news stories. If we cannot fill our program, we will give it to Dentso and they will Interview with Alexander Kluge produce a program about the best of world sports. I only have to deal with twenty-six hours, and they will be devoted to the best narratives, that is, best opera, best film, and so on. Each should be so short that there will be several programs in twenty-four minutes, like a magazine format. More radical than the cooperative films, but to some extent it's similar. It's like a newspaper, and Balzac wrote for newspapers, as did Hemingway. In this way, you can make original products. It is very difficult to make a ninety-minute program that is very different from the format of television. But you can be very unschematic in a very short form. It is not that I am so happy about this situation. I would like only to make eighteen-hour films; I only write thick, thoroughgoing books like Ges AK: We have an average time, some prime time, some "B1," "B," and "C" time. We need a mixture of all, but half of it will be "A" time, that is, prime time. We will have difficulty, of course, in getting an audience, but Heimat, made by Reitz, had an audience. Fathers and Sons [1986] by Bernd Sinkel had an audience. It is not necessary that my films have a majority audience. Our ten percent means that we assemble all minorities on Saturdays against the majority program of someone else.
SL: Do you know how the public responds to your television programs?
AK: Of course. We have high ratings. We are accepted in all television broadcast systems, public and private. We do not have much time because we cannot produce very much. But the programs we produce are accepted. The second point is that we get new authors, from the radio, from journals, from opera houses, from book publishers. Not so many film directors follow this course, AK: I don't believe in revolutions from above. That's one of the "infantile disorders" of the Autorenfilm as well. But I cannot begin to revolutionize society on the basis of film. Therefore, I must accept this contradiction. The strategy "from below" will first of all not work for the mass media. Not everybody is a cameraman, or a scriptwriter, or is talented, or has the time, or the airtime. It is nonsense to say that all of the people are the basis of a TV system. Professionalism is not within everyone's reach -not because of a lack of talent but because of a lack of time. In certain small areas of the media, however, the strategy from below does work. For example, a film scene will only be good if the coworkers fill it out. I must, so to speak, establish a framework dictatorially, so that freedom can prevail within this framework, within the "capillaries. 
SL: Is that true of younger filmmakers too?
AK: Not all. We have a new Munich school. Dorris Dorrie is not among them. These are thoroughly qualified people, but I cannot conclude that they are all talented, though I would be happy if that were the case. They believe in Spielberg and so on, and not at all in politics. They believe completely in a professional fantasy: some day having a huge budget with three assistants. It's a strange idea, but very common. They think a real director must be recognized with a telephone call from Hollywood or somewhere, and he mustn't do anything political. They find politics boring. They believe that one shouldn't fight. AK: But look, we have the majority. These young people who do not share our views do not organize. They tried to organize a rebellion here at the Munich film festival for the last two years. It was encouraged by the director of the festival, who wanted the creation of a new anti-Oberhausen direction to be his festival's goal. It collapsed miserably because it was not interesting. They tried, but they were only malcontents, and it didn't fly. SL: Your political activism, your conviction in the "porosity" of society and of the individuals who compose it significantly distinguish your work, as well as your joint projects with Oskar Negt, about which I hope we can speak later, from the passivity and the pessimistic stance of the older generation of Critical Theorists. In what sense do you believe you are carrying on their tradition? AK: We believe that our work has to do with Critical Theory. We contend that it is orthodox. But it is a matter of dispute between us and Horkheimer and Adorno. Circumstances have changed. The great classes don't really exist anymore. The bourgeois class doesn't govern. There are nearly no proprietors anymore. Oh, some of them, but not as a class. The working class doesn't represent the part of society that produces the wealth. For the most part they have been corrupted. They are a workers' aristocracy, especially in those industries that are in decline, which the society doesn't need at all. In Silicon Valley, who is the proletarian and who is the bourgeois? Actually, the middle and petit-bourgeois classes have always made the principal developments. The haute bourgeoisie did not dominate and the working class never dominated. Rather, it was what might be called an in-between class, a merchant class, shop owners, an artisan class. In matters of culture they were the trendsetters. The top of the petite bourgeoisie, which rose into the middle classes, that was where the greatest motivation was. This class is now also blended with others. You can deduce things from Marx, but you really have to look into human beings. It is in them that the capitalist and the proletarian stand opposed to each other. SL: This attempt to understand the working class "from the inside," as it were, was certainly a major part of Critical Theory's program from the beginning of the Horkheimer years at the Institute. How does your and Negt's project differ? AK: Society is a text that we attempt to read. Adorno would say it is entirely legitimate, but we must be much more careful than when reading Proust. For Proust is a successful expression, but whether or not society is a successful OCTOBER expression cannot be known. Adorno would simply express himself via a pars pro toto using music as an example. I am, however, completely indifferent to some of the questions that were important to him, whether the four last String Quartets by Beethoven are the whole world or not. I am not a critic, and it doesn't interest me. It would only be of concern to me if I needed them for a film. We must defend other areas than the older generation defended. We would say we are in such a dire situation because of how the enemy operates, how he impoverishes relationships, how he further confuses language. We therefore do not have the time, we cannot pose the question of whether we can explain music, whether we can discuss it in academic terms. We are more careful than Adorno and more like Brecht. We are in a situation like the one Bert Brecht describes: "If the house is burning, I run outside." But we do not want to have to emigrate, and therefore we must be better armed. It is old-fashioned to assume as they did in the 1930s that these struggles will be determined in the streets when there is a mass medium in every house that acts as a kind of window. Against such a power to convince millions through television, all conventional means are powerless. That means that I also have to produce for this window. I can only influence a mass medium through a counter-mass medium. An entire public sphere through a counter-public sphere. I cannot counter a society through a counter-society. That is war. One has, therefore, to seek a way out. 
13.
See, however, the translator's note about the term in the selections from Offentlichkeit und Erfahrung in this issue. 14.
Neuwied, Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 1962.
OCTOBER AK: It is not really opposed. It is a response as part of a process of discussion. We quite agree with him about the necessity of the process of enlightenment, of the need for a new encyclopedia. Habermas, however, is a bit more cautious than we are, and he does not express himself in an inductive way. He would only work in a discursive way. Negt's and my notion of Offentlichkeit proceeds from the sphere of production. I will interpret it via an example drawn from jurisprudence. We say there is a law of production. When a worker works on something, it belongs to him. It is unjust to take away something somebody has worked on. We find this kind of law in fairy tales; this is the law that people really can understand. We, however, have Roman law, which is based on distributive principles: who does it belong to, not who made it. Habermas's Offentlichkeit is a distributive Offentlichkeit, while the one we speak of is a productive Offentlichkeit. And it is this productive sphere as it functions in the most intimate spheres of private life that must be studied, because in it are the origins of the collapse in 1933. Our point of departure always remains the public sphere of 1933 that could be conquered by the National Socialists. This must be fortified in different ways so that it cannot be conquered. If the public sphere, that is, the container for the political, was inadequate and therefore conquered by the Nazis, then it is useless to study the achievements of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and to repeat and defend the old conception of the public sphere, as Habermas does, for no moral resistance was objectively possible within it. That means that we must look into the production sphere, where the potential for resistance is hidden. Adorno believed that Hollywood could be the proprietor of this factory, and we do not. We understand the maneuvers of Hollywood: step on the gas and then on the brakes, more gas and then brake again. Negative pick-up system and produce by yourself, and so on and so forth. You notice that Habermas in his latest books comes back to the concept of expression, which plays an extraordinarily important role. It is the core of his communications theory, at least recently. "Knowledge" and "interests" were still, so to speak, understood mechanically. It is an abstract specification, for Interview with Alexander Kluge there are no interests independent from knowledge and emotion. There are always interests and imagination. It is false for the effort of enlightenment to attempt to separate them. It creates something lifeless. Knowledge is not only always correlated with interests, but also with an incredible number of other things, for example, love of one's parents, laziness, curiosity, feelings of security, self-confidence, an opportunity, an auspicious moment-all of these constitute knowledge.
SL
SL: Does the "classical" bourgeois public sphere that Habermas describes still exist? Did it really ever exist or is it just an idealized historical fantasy? AK: It exists, but it is itself only a counter-public sphere. It is still very potent, it has a budget of some billions of Marks, but it is only a detail. It is not the whole. It can pretend to be public life in the classical sense, but it could never be. SL: Would you expand on the concept you just used, namely that of a "Gegen-Offentlichkeit," or "counter-public sphere"? AK: Gegen-Offentlichkeit is a twentieth-century phenomenon. Only now is it really possible to develop counter-public spheres. For example, in Florence during the Renaissance we do not need the concept of a Gegen-Offentlichkeit. The public sphere was, for the times, sufficient. There was no genuine counter-public sphere. The counter-public sphere of the monks or of Savonarola was a perverse public sphere. It is not an alternative to the Medici's public sphere. A proletariat did not exist at all. It would be doctrinaire to say it existed. During the nineteenth century, several competing counter-public spheres emerged. One of these, one among many, is that of the working classes. Up till then it had not developed its own, either because its expressive potential fell immediately under the control of the party or the unions, or because it was taken over by the bourgeois public sphere. It remained in an embryonic state, very much alive, but it could not be extended over the immediate area in which people lived and struggled. To this extent one can say that the public sphere is one of the means of production that have been taken away from the working class. In the meantime, industry has stagnated or changed to such an extent that a proletariat in the classical sense does not exist anymore. It is probably not at all possible anymore to develop a proletarian public sphere. SL: But don't the changes in industry and in many spheres of production create new bases for a counter-public sphere, or rather, spheres? Wouldn't the women's movement be one product of such changes and the basis of a new counter-public sphere? AK: Yes. All counter-public spheres naturally have the tendency of becoming a OCTOBER public sphere. The public sphere of the Jacobins in the French Revolution, for example, or that of the Gironde, or of the Quartier Saint Antoine, wants to become the whole of the public sphere, and toward this end tends to suppress the others. In our disintegrating society, the public sphere and the sphere of intimacy atrophy at the same time. By the latter I mean the family, in which intimacy becomes more impoverished and which impoverishes the public sphere to the same degree. These processes produce a pluralism of public spheres, so that we don't really have any public sphere at all, but loudly competing public spheres that do not understand each other: one for science, one for industry, one for politicians, one for culture, and so on. We have Babylon. We have, so to speak, a universal provincialism. On the other hand, this phenomenon produces the possibility of building a public sphere anew. She is as precise as one of Adorno's analyses. He was also a composer, but he never took examples from his own work when he described musical distinctions. Why should I take cover in the microstructure of the films and rummage around in them? There is no need for that.
How, moreover, can one defend the work's microstructure against the immense, overwhelming forces that come from the macrostructures of social relationships pressing in on a film, that try to drive everything into a ghetto? These require a theoretical answer. Critical theory does not concern itself with film, but rather with the possible expressive means and with the real circumstances. An artist exercises an incredibly refined control over his materials, and it is almost impossible to repeat them verbally. According to a pupil of Aristotle's, there were always two geographers who followed the route of Alexander the Great's army. They always had a rope that they carried along so as to measure the meters behind them. Starting from Athens, when they arrived at the Indus, they had experienced the world. They had walked over everything with two, or rather four, feet. So everything had been deciphered, yet only fifty meters away from the road on which they had traveled there was a riddle. It is necessary to be very cautious when it comes to aesthetic products.
SL: I am puzzled by your metaphorical illustration. I think you mean to suggest that no matter how much the road is measured and analyzed, there will always be a mystery beyond. OK, but the road that has been experienced and measured is
